Authors
Dustin Stokes
University of Utah
Abstract
Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as it is the case for modularity theories of perception, then modules are on this account impenetrable. However, we argue that there are genuine cases of the cognitive penetrability of perception and that these cases challenge any strong, encapsulated modular architecture of perception. Second, many recent massive modularity theories weaken the strength of the notion of module, while broadening the scope of modularity. These theories do not require any robust informational encapsulation, and thus avoid the incompatibility with cognitive penetrability. However, the weakened commitment to informational encapsulation greatly weakens the explanatory force of the theory and, ultimately, is conceptually at odds with the core of modularity.
Keywords Modularity  Architecture of the mind  Cognition  Perception  Cognitive penetrability
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s13194-015-0107-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Sciences of the Artificial.Herbert A. Simon - 1969 - [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.
What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.

View all 73 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):303-318.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception.Irene Appelbaum - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.
Layers in the Fabric of Mind: A Critical Review of Cognitive Ontogeny.G. Nagarjuna - 2006 - In Jayashree Ramadas & Sugra Chunawala (eds.), Research Trends in Science, Technology and Mathematics Education. Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education, TIFR.
Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity and Evolvability.Claudia Lorena García - 2007 - Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution and Cognition (KLI) 2 (1):62-73.
Is the Mind Really Modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. Oxford University Press.
On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity.John M. Collins - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-02

Total views
821 ( #4,650 of 2,324,595 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #13,288 of 2,324,595 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes