A ética kantiana E a possibilidade do altruísmo (thomas nagel)
Abstract
The present article discusses the relation of Th. Nagel’s ethics of altruism with kantian ethics. According to Nagel himself, his position resembles that of Kant in two respects: it defends the thesis of the autonomy of moral motivation, and it bases moral on a determinate self-conception of persons. However, differently from Kant, the principle of Nagel’s ethics is just the modest presupposition that persons essentially understand themselves as being one among a plurality of other persons. Starting from the nagelian argument in The Possibility of Altruism (1970), but contemplating also Nagel’s more recent position in The Last Word (1999), it is argued that in order to defend his conception of a rational ethics in a convincing way, Nagel has to approximate himself more to the kantian foundation of ethics than he wants to admit.