Against the Supposed Obligation to Prolong the Human Species

Res Philosophica 101 (3):639-647 (2024)
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Abstract

Advocates of Mars colonies commonly assert a supposed obligation to act so as to maximize the longevity of the human species. When this principle is defended, it is often by appeal to the alleged costs—of incoherence or misanthropy—of denying it. Against this supposed obligation, I argue for two theses. The modest thesis: it is not incoherent and need not be misanthropic to prefer human extinction sooner rather than later. The ambitious thesis: we should prefer human extinction sooner rather than later. The supposed obligation to prolong our species is no justification of human activities in space.

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Ian Stoner
Saint Paul College

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References found in this work

Humans Should Not Colonize Mars.Ian Stoner - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):334-353.
Space Colonization and Existential Risk.Joseph Gottlieb - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):306-320.
Our Moral Obligation to Support Space Exploration.James Schwartz - 2011 - Environmental Ethics 33 (1):67-88.

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