Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663 (2013)

Authors
Dustin Stokes
University of Utah
Abstract
Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, its theoretical consequences, and a variety of experimental results and possible interpretations of them. The paper concludes by proposing some constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability
Keywords Cognitive penetration  Perception  Cognition
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12043
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Automatically Minded.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11).
Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.

View all 59 citations / Add more citations

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