Synthese 184 (2):137-155 (2009)
In this paper, I argue that there are good motivations for a relativist account of the domain-sensitivity of quantifier phrases. I will frame the problem as a puzzle involving what looks like a logically valid inference, yet one whose premises are true while the conclusion is false. After discussing some existing accounts, literalist and contextualist, I will present and argue for an account that may be said to be relativist in the following sense: (i) a domain of quantification is required for determining truth value, but is idle in determining semantic content, and (ii) the same sentence, as used on one and the same occasion, may receive different truth values relative to different domains
|Keywords||philpapers: relativism about truth|
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References found in this work BETA
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Citations of this work BETA
Emotional Disagreement: The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values.Isidora Stojanovic - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):99-117.
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