Erkenntnis:1-21 (forthcoming)

Authors
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Abstract
Abstract: According to (what I will call) an inner awareness theory of consciousness, you are in a (phenomenally) conscious state only if you are aware, in some sense, of your being in the state. This theory is widely held, but what arguments are there for holding it? In this paper, I gather together in a systematic way the main arguments for holding the theory and suggest that none of them is persuasive. I end the paper by asking what our attitude to the theory should be if there is no existing argument for it.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-021-00415-8
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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