Philosophical Studies 174 (4):853-859 (2017)

Authors
Andreas Stokke
Uppsala University
Abstract
This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.
Keywords Lying  Metaphors  Definite descriptions  Common ground  Assertion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0709-0
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.
Testimonial Worth.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2391-2411.

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