On believing that I am thinking

Tom Stoneham
University of York
It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person ascriptions with Objectivism about the propositional attitudes. The epistemic justification of second-order beliefs is shown to be a further question
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Proposition  Thinking  Descartes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9264.00028
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,723
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Always Being Right (About What One is Thinking).Finn Spicer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 137-160.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
Is Belief a Propositional Attitude?Ray Buchanan - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
Evidentialism and Faith: Believing in Order to Know.John Zeis - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:185-200.
Animal Belief.Roger Fellows - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
On Justifying and Being Justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
The Basic Notion of Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.


Added to PP index

Total downloads
24 ( #246,227 of 2,261,362 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #386,986 of 2,261,362 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature