On believing that I am thinking

It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person ascriptions with Objectivism about the propositional attitudes. The epistemic justification of second-order beliefs is shown to be a further question
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Proposition  Thinking  Descartes
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9264.00028
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On Always Being Right (About What One is Thinking).Finn Spicer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 137-160.

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