Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: a Physiological Objection

Acta Analytica 32 (1):73-93 (2017)
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Abstract

Using the results of the latest neurophysiological research on colour, the article rejects outright physicalism and dispositionalism as appropriate approaches to solving the problem of colour realism. Physicalism sees colour as a real property of objects, i.e. the reflectance profile, while dispositionalism takes subjects, objects and light as necessary elements for colour production. First, it briefly outlines the historical development of the theory of colour, pointing towards dispositionalism which, in some sense, considers colour as a real entity of the world, and then introduces the problem of colour realism, focusing on objections to physicalism as well as dispositionalism. After delineating the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the visual experience of colour, and with the help of the concrete results of practical neurophysiological experiments, the article points to why the physicalist and any dispositionalist theories of colour in the light of a new physiological objection do not present credible views on the nature of colour.

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Citations of this work

In Defense of Color Realism.Corey McGrath - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (1):101-127.

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References found in this work

How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.

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