Oxford, UK: Oxford, Clarendon Press (1973)

Abstract
This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Hume's argument that induction must be either deductively valid or circular because based on experience neglects the possibility that it is an argument of non-deductive logic (logical probability, in the sense of Keynes).
Keywords Skepticism  Probabilities  Hume  Logical probability  Non-deductive logic  Induction
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Call number B1499.S4.S76 1973
ISBN(s) 0198245017   9780198245018
DOI 10.2307/2218288
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What Did Hume Really Show About Induction?Samir Okasha - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.
Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
Humes Old and New: Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth.Peter Millican - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):163-199.
Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock & David W. Agler - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.

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