Physicalism and phenomenal concepts

Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302 (2005)
Authors
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Abstract
A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea
Keywords Epistemology  Phenomena  Physicalism  Sense Data
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00296.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,723
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.

View all 42 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy.David Papineau - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.
A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.
Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities II.D. H. Mellor - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities.L. C. Holborow - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162.
A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties.Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July):296-302.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
340 ( #11,055 of 2,261,362 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #9,592 of 2,261,362 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature