Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):564-579 (2019)

Authors
Rowland Stout
University College Dublin
Abstract
The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2018.1463839
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Reason.R. M. Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Summa Theologica.Thomasn D. Aquinas - 1274 - Hayes Barton Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2021 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. pp. 171-184.

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