Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4227-4237 (2021)

Authors
Frank Jackson
Australian National University
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Abstract
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne have recently presented a thought experiment—Mirror Man—designed to refute internalist theories of belief and content. We distinguish five ways in which the case can be interpreted and argue that on none does it refute internalism.
Keywords Belief  Lewis  Narrow Content  Intrinsic Properties  Philosophy of Mind
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-021-01645-w
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References found in this work BETA

Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Reduction of Mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
In Defence of Narrow Content.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):539-550.
What's the Meaning of "This"?Thomas Baldwin & David Austin - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):111.

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