Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience

Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-genuine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic penetration hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of importance to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology, and general philosophy of science. The plausibility of orectic perception can be motivated by some classic experimental studies, and some new experimental research inspired by those same studies. The general suggestion is that orectic penetration thus defined, and evidenced by the relevant studies, cannot be deflected by the standard strategies of the cognitive impenetrability theorist.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-09-27

Downloads
2,659 (#3,389)

6 months
246 (#11,491)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dustin Stokes
University of Utah

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.

View all 42 references / Add more references