Talking about taste: Disagreement, implicit arguments, and relative truth

Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn, according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence containing a taste predicate, and given any assignment of values to the relevant parameters, the two accounts predict the same truth value and are, in that sense, equivalent. I also look at possible reasons for preferring one account over the other. The phenomenon of "faultless disagreement" is often believed to be one such reason. I argue, against Kölbel and Lasersohn, that disagreement is never faultless: either the two parties genuinely disagree, hence if the one is right then the other is wrong, or the two parties are both right, but their apparent disagreement boils down to a misunderstanding. What is more, even if there were faultless disagreement, I argue that relativism would fail to account for it. The upshot of my paper, then, is to show that there is not much disagreement between a contextualist account that models the judge parameter as an implicit argument to the taste predicate, and a relativist account that models it as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation. The choice between the two accounts, at least when talking about taste, is thus, to a large extent, a matter of taste.
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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DOI 10.1007/s10988-008-9030-5
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References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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Citations of this work BETA
Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142.
Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement.Carl Baker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371.
Retractions.Teresa Marques - 2015 - Synthese:1-25.
Disagreement Without Error.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations

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