Two Conceptions of the Physical

Abstract
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; a priori physicalism is false; if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false. The paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy
Keywords Falsity  Metaphysics  Mind  Physical
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Erik C. Banks (2010). Neutral Monism Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.

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