Two Conceptions of the Physical

Abstract
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; a priori physicalism is false; if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false. The paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy
Keywords Falsity  Metaphysics  Mind  Physical
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x
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References found in this work BETA
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology.Ned Block (ed.) - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
Passage and Perception.Simon Prosser - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):69-84.

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