Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253 - 281 (2001)
The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; a priori physicalism is false; if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false. The paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy
|Keywords||Falsity Metaphysics Mind Physical|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear From Ghosts Than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.
Similar books and articles
Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustin Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.
The Physical: Empirical, Not Metaphysical.J. L. Dowell, & Janice Dowell - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.
How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New.Barbara Montero - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189.
Introduction.Daniel Stoljar - 2003 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press.
The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads315 ( #9,410 of 2,170,053 )
Recent downloads (6 months)21 ( #16,035 of 2,170,053 )
How can I increase my downloads?