Constantin Stoenescu
University of Bucharest
The standard definition of knowledge and the concept of objective knowledge, as they were described in the epistemology sprung from the Vienna Circle, are too restricted in comparison with our natural disposal to admit different beliefs as reliable. The main guilt for this state of arts in epistemology belongs to the so- called, in Wolterstorff’s terms, “doxastic ideal”, namely, the traditional picture of the ideally formed beliefs. Locke’s view of entitlement was the modern expression of this ideal and Hume’s analysis of beliefs about future was its first powerful criticism. If we succeed in rejecting this ideal, then it become possible to extend the epistemological analysis over other sorts of beliefs, religious beliefs included
Keywords doxastic ideal  justified true belief  Objective knowledge  Vienna Circle  religious belief  reliably formed belief
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Charles A. Baylis - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4):600-601.
Epistemology of Religion.Nicholas Wolterstorff - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell.

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