Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308 (2018)

Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
According to a reflexive theory of consciousness, a person is in a conscious state only if they are conscious of, or aware of, being in the state. This paper reconsiders the well-known regress objection against theories of this sort, according to which they entail that if you are in one conscious state, you are in an infinity of such states. I distinguish two versions of the reflexive theory, a cognitive version and a phenomenal version, and argue that, while the cognitive version of the reflexive theory may evade the regress objection, this is not the case for the phenomenal version.
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12132
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.
Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.

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On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.

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