What is it like to have an unconscious mental state?

Philosophical Studies 104 (2):179-202 (2001)
HOST is the theory that to be conscious of a mental state is totarget it with a higher-order state , either an innerperception or a higher-order thought. Some champions of HOSTmaintain that the phenomenological character of a sensory stateis induced in it by representing it with a HOS. I argue that thisthesis is vulnerable to overwhelming objections that flow largelyfrom HOST itself. In the process I answer two questions: `What isa plausible sufficient condition for a quale's belonging to aparticular mental state?' and `What is the propositional contentof HOSs that target sensory states?'
Keywords Content  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mind  Proposition  Qualia  Unconscious
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010323814223
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