What is it like to have an unconscious mental state?

Philosophical Studies 104 (2):179-202 (2001)
HOST is the theory that to be conscious of a mental state is totarget it with a higher-order state , either an innerperception or a higher-order thought. Some champions of HOSTmaintain that the phenomenological character of a sensory stateis induced in it by representing it with a HOS. I argue that thisthesis is vulnerable to overwhelming objections that flow largelyfrom HOST itself. In the process I answer two questions: `What isa plausible sufficient condition for a quale's belonging to aparticular mental state?' and `What is the propositional contentof HOSs that target sensory states?'
Keywords Content  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mind  Proposition  Qualia  Unconscious
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1010323814223
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,674
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jim Stone (2005). Why There Still Are No People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

62 ( #77,783 of 1,903,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #219,664 of 1,903,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.