Philosophy Compass 1 (4):373-397 (2006)

Authors
Isidora Stojanovic
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
Philosophers of language distinguish among the lexical or linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered, what is said by an utterance of the sentence, and speaker's meaning, or what is conveyed by the speaker to her audience. In most views, what is said is the semantic or truth-conditional content of the utterance, and is irreducible either to the linguistic meaning or to the speaker's meaning. I will show that those views account badly for people's intuitions on what is said. I will also argue that no distinguished level of what is said is required, and that the notion of linguistic meaning is the best placed to play the role of what is said. This relies on two points. First, our intuitions on what is said cannot be detached from the ways in which we talk about what is said, and from the semantics of speech reports and indirect discourse in general. Second, besides what is said, there is an equally important notion of what what-is-said is said about, or that about which the speaker is talking. These are, then, the three main ingredients needed for the theory of what is said: linguistic meaning, what is talked about, and a semantic account of reported speech
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00029.x
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning.Nat Hansen - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):617-632.
Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality.Richard Dietz & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):403-427.

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