Why there still are no people

Abstract
This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons
Keywords Connectedness  Eliminativism  Epistemology  Identity  Survival
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00510.x
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References found in this work BETA
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - MIT Press.
Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons.Derek A. Parfit - 1987 - In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA
Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Skepticism About Persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Strategy for Animalism.Joungbin Lim - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-15.

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