What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question

Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402 (2010)
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Abstract

A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it are rebutted, and the possibility of rejecting the second rather than the first of these assumptions is explored briefly

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Author's Profile

Rowland Stout
University College Dublin

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Practical Know‐Wh.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):855-870.
Gilbert Ryle’s adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.

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References found in this work

Frege’s puzzle.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Ridgeview.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.

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