What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question
Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402 (2010)
Abstract
A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it are rebutted, and the possibility of rejecting the second rather than the first of these assumptions is explored brieflyAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - Erkenntnis:1-19.
Gilbert Ryle’s adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
Frege’s recognition criterion for thoughts and its problems.Mark Textor - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2677-2696.
References found in this work
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.