Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166 (2006)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the independent evaluative truths that realism posits, on the other. Realism, I argue, can give no satisfactory account of this relation. On the one hand, the realist may claim that there is no relation between evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes and independent evaluative truths. But this claim leads to the implausible skeptical result that most of our evaluative judgements are off track due to the distorting pressure of Darwinian forces. The realist’s other option is to claim that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and independent evaluative truths, namely that natural selection favored ancestors who were able to grasp those truths. But this account, I argue, is unacceptable on scientific grounds. Either way, then, realist theories of value prove unable to accommodate the fact that Darwinian forces have deeply influenced the content of human values. After responding to three objections, the third of which leads me to argue against a realist understanding of the disvalue of pain, I conclude by sketching how antirealism is able to sidestep the dilemma I have presented. Antirealist theories of value are able to offer an alternative account of the relation between evolutionary forces and evaluative facts — an account that allows us to reconcile our understanding of evaluative truth with our understanding of the many non-rational causes that have played a role in shaping our evaluative judgements.
|
Keywords | Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2006 |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
View all 38 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
View all 461 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
On Structuralism’s Multiple Paths Through Spacetime Theories.Edward Slowik - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):45-66.
Can Darwinian Inheritance Be Extended From Biology to Epistemology?Carla E. Kary - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:356 - 369.
From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study.J. L. Dowell - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):149-173.
Testing for Convergent Realism.Jerrold L. Aronson - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):255-259.
Progress: Metaphysical and Otherwise.Robert Wachbroit - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):354-371.
Synthesis of Theories Through Parametrisation of Laws: II. Example: Neo-Darwinian Synthetic Theory.Gebhard Geiger - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (3):357 - 368.
More Worries for Structural Realism: A Dilemma From the Relativized a Priori.Milena Ivanova - manuscript
Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
2,537 ( #1,572 of 2,506,921 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
137 ( #4,806 of 2,506,921 )
2009-01-28
Total views
2,537 ( #1,572 of 2,506,921 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
137 ( #4,806 of 2,506,921 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads