An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons

Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188 (2019)

Caj Strandberg
University of Oslo
According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable to do so. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view about normative reasons which involves the same notion of rationality as internalism, at the same time as it is able to account for categorical moral reasons. Thus, it evades the dilemma.
Keywords normative reasons  internalism  externalism  practical rationality  categorical
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-20170009
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References found in this work BETA

Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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