Utilitas 15 (2):237-47 (2003)

Authors
Bart Streumer
University of Groningen
Abstract
Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820800003976
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
A Theory of the Good and the Right.Richard B. Brandt - 1979 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 35 (2):307-310.
Global Consequentialism.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2000 - In Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason & Dale Miller (eds.), Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press.
A Theory of the Good and the Right.Brenda Cohen - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):271-273.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Ambitions of Consequentialism.Brian McElwee - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2).

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