Conceptual Disagreement

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):15-28 (2019)

Authors
Sarah Stroud
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Can you disagree with someone without thinking that what they say is false? As we shall see, this is not only possible but quite frequent. Starting with the type of disagreement most familiar from the philosophical literature, we will progressively expand the circle of genuine disagreement until it encompasses even conceptual disagreement, which might sound like a contradiction in terms. For conceptual disagreement necessarily involves the parties' using different concepts, which one might think would preclude genuine disagreement. We shall argue otherwise, adducing three different types of case in order to demonstrate the scope of this phenomenon.
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References found in this work BETA

Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
Conceptual Ethics I.David Plunkett Alexis Burgess - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
The Reasons of a Living Being.Allan Gibbard - 2002 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 (2):49 - 60.

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Citations of this work BETA

Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):245-268.
Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1571-1592.
Conceptual Exploration.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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