Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?

Ratio 26 (4):450-470 (2013)
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Abstract

Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world

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Bart Streumer
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.
No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.
Are moral properties impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Language, Truth and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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