European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228 (2003)

Authors
Bart Streumer
University of Groningen
Abstract
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0378.00184
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.D. E. Over - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Lou Goble - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):242-244.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.
Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

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