Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?

European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228 (2003)
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Abstract

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.

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Bart Streumer
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.
Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.

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References found in this work

Studies in the Way of Words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):121-168.
Studies in the Way of Words.D. E. Over - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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