Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):37-47 (2005)

Authors
Lloyd Strickland
Manchester Metropolitan University
Abstract
The concept of the best of all possible worlds is widely considered to be incoherent on the grounds that, for any world that might be termed the best, there is always another that is better. I note that underlying this argument is a conviction that the goodness of a world is determined by a single kind of good, the most plausible candidates for which are not maximizable. Against this I suggest that several goods may have to combine to determine the goodness of a world, and because of logical conflicts between them, the goods can be optimized to give a genuine best of all possible worlds.
Keywords Optimism  Best possible world
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-006-6863-4
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References found in this work BETA

.R. G. Swinburne - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Leibniz's Best World Claim Restructured.William C. Lane - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):57-84.
False Optimism? Leibniz, Evil, and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Lloyd Strickland - 2010 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1):17-35.
Leibniz’s and Herder’s Philosophy of Optimism.Vasil Gluchman - 2021 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 11 (1-2):37-47.
False Optimism? Leibniz, Evil, and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Lloyd Strickland - 2010 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1):17-35.

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