American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):81-91 (2012)

Authors
Caj Strandberg
University of Oslo
Abstract
According to a persistent objection against metaethical expressivism, this view is committed to a strong version of internalism which is unable to account for cases where a person’s moral judgment and motivation come apart. Recently, leading expressivists have argued that they can meet this objection by maintaining that moral judgments consist in non-cognitive states that motivate in normal conditions. In this paper, it is maintained that an important dimension of internalism has, on the whole, gone unnoticed: Internalist claims vary depending on whether moral judgments and motivation are understood as dispositional states or occurrent states. This variation can be invoked in an argument showing that expressivists are indeed committed to versions of internalism that make it impossible to account for cases in which moral judgment and motivation diverge.
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References found in this work BETA

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Motivation and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Moral Problem.James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
Ethical Judgment and Motivation.David Faraci & Tristram McPherson - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 308-323.
Options for Hybrid Expressivism.Caj Strandberg - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
Practical Oomph: A Case for Subjectivism.Matthew Bedke - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):657-677.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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