Philosophia 35 (2):249-260 (2007)
In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.
|Keywords||Internalism Externalism Fetishist argument motivation Michael Smith metaethics moral judgment|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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