Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248 (2009)

Authors
Sharon Street
New York University
Abstract
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.— Quine
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2009.10717649
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References found in this work BETA

A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 234-248.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.
The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science.Arnon Levy & Yair Levy - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):491-509.

View all 41 citations / Add more citations

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