Abstract

In this dissertation Emile Durkheim's philosophy of science is reconstructed in the light of his historical context and the development of his ideas. In the first chapter this philosophy is distinguished from his theory of society and specific views of social science methodology; it is argued that this philosophy constitutes a framework to justify the pursuit of his sociological research program. In the second chapter, an intellectual context for the dissertation is provided through an analysis of three topics: his views on reductionism and holism in science, his preliminary specification of his field of research, the domain of social facts, and the structure of his critiques of his predecessors and contemporaries. Durkheim's philosophic framework is divided into three major parts. In the third chapter it is argued that Durkheim's epistemology arose out of Kantianism and attempted to positivism are discussed and it is shown that Durkheim's views are positivistic in only the most general, and least interesting, senses. In the fourth chapter the role of hypotheses and models in Durkheim's research program is analyzed, and his theoretical discussion of these notions is reconstructed. A non-inductivist account of his method is suggested. In the fifth chapter his rejection of a Humean notion of causation is analyzed, and the influence of Durkheim's notion of causation on his The Rules of Sociological Method is discussed. Throughout the dissertation the views of other commentators on Durkheim, such as Anthony Giddens, Russell Keat and John Urry, and Steven Lukes, are critically assessed