Oxford University Press (1986)
On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom.
|Keywords||Belief Choice Commitment Experience Freedom Metaphysics Objectivism Subjectivism Truth Kant|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$14.95 used (64% off) $27.48 new (33% off) $34.21 direct from Amazon (17% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.S77 1986|
|ISBN(s)||0199247501 9780199247493 9780199247509|
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Citations of this work BETA
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
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