Modal Humeanism and Arguments from Possibility

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):391-401 (2013)

Authors
Margot Strohminger
Oxford University
Abstract
Sider (2011, 2013) proposes a reductive analysis of metaphysical modality—‘(modal) Humeanism’—and goes on to argue that it has interesting epistemological and methodological implications. In particular, Humeanism is supposed to undermine a class of ‘arguments from possibility’, which includes Sider's (1993) own argument against mereological nihilism and Chalmers's (1996) argument against physicalism. I argue that Sider's arguments do not go through, and moreover that we should instead expect Humeanism to be compatible with the practice of arguing from possibility in philosophy
Keywords metaphysical modality  modal epistemology  thought experiments  mereological nihilism  modal Humeanism  reductive analysis of modality  argument from possibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00361.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
Modal Epistemology.Peter Van Inwagen - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1):67--84.
Abduction and Modality.Stephen Biggs - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Lewis' Reduction of Modality.Sandy Berkovski - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):95-114.
Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument.Nikk Effingham - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):241 - 250.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-27

Total views
595 ( #7,817 of 2,310,118 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
57 ( #12,045 of 2,310,118 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature