American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400 (1986)

Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin
This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
Keywords Action  Compatibilism  Epistemology  Freedom  Harry Frankfurt  principle of alternative possibilities
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