Phenomenal Intentionality and the Temporal Shape of Experience

Disputatio 15 (68):55-89 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper argues for the claim that the mental ontology required for what has been called the “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” (PIT) should be understood in terms of mental events or episodes, not mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties because the former but not the latter has a kind of temporal shape. I begin by laying out the basic commitments of PIT. I then introduce the notion of “temporal shape” and defend the following simple but powerful argument: (1) If conscious experiences are phenomenal mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties, then the phenomenal character of these experiences will lack a temporal shape. (2) The phenomenal character of conscious experience typically has a temporal shape. (3) Therefore, conscious experiences are not mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties.

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Christopher Stratman
University of Texas at San Antonio

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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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