Authors
Jada Twedt Strabbing
Wayne State University
Abstract
I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View. According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability-relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12259
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Accountability and the Thoughts in Reactive Attitudes.Jada Strabbing - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3121-3140.

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