Reason attribution without belief-desire ascription
Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):157-180 (2012)
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10.1163/9789401209182_010
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Citations of this work
The expressive function of folk psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
Coordination without meta-representation.Camilla Colombo & Francesco Guala - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (5):684-717.