Roger Crisp on goodness and reasons

Mind 118 (472):1081-1094 (2009)
Roger Crisp distinguishes a positive and a negative aspect of the buck-passing account of goodness (BPA), and argues that the positive account should be dropped in order to avoid certain problems, in particular, that it implies eliminativism about value. This eliminativism involves what I call an ontological claim, the claim that there is no real property of goodness, and an error theory, the claim that all value talk is false. I argue first that the positive aspect of the BPA is necessary to explain the negative aspect. I accept the ontological claim but argue that this does not imply any sort of error theory about value
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp136
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