Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):279-297 (2005)

Authors
Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything has intentionality—all the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it—perhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentionality is a realistic conception of naturalism and a properly developed understanding of the phenomenon of cognitive experience.
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Naturalism  Realism
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Citations of this work BETA

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