Self-intimation

Abstract
Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order to be constituted as awareness in the first place. Can anything relate to itself in this way? Can there be a relation that is necessarily one-term, reflexive, non-logical , concretely realizable, dynamically real, such that its holding is a necessary condition of the existence of the thing it holds of? It helps to consider the thought this very thought is puzzling. Many accept the reality of the kind of awareness of awareness posited in and , and think it must be not only ‘pre-reflective’ and ‘non-positional’, but also irrelational or non-intentional. But perhaps such awareness of awareness can be fully relational and fully intentional, and can be legitimately said to be its own object or content, even while being pre-reflective and non-positional
Keywords Awareness  Consciousness  Experience  Awareness of awareness  Aristotle  Descartes  Brentano  Phenomenology  Reflexivity  Awareness of awareness  Same-order theories of consciousness  Self-identity  Advaita Vedānta  Meditation  Buddhism  Indian philosophy  Self-intimation  Ryle  This very thought is puzzling
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-013-9339-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,157
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism.Michael Kelly - 2002 - Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.David Rosenthal - 2012 - Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness.Michael Huemer - 1998 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
Consciousness During Dreams.P. Cicogna & M. Bosinelli - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2013-10-06

Total downloads

92 ( #55,712 of 2,163,678 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #33,591 of 2,163,678 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums