Michael Strevens
New York University
Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. The project Clarifications The negligibility argument Generalization and proof.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi133
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References found in this work BETA

The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.

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Evidential Holism.Joe Morrison - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12417.

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