Analysis 68 (4):271-282 (2008)

Authors
Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Suppose that X and Y can’t possibly exist apart in reality; then—by definition—there’s no real distinction between them, only a conceptual distinction. There’s a conceptual distinction between a rectilinear figure’s triangularity and its trilaterality, for example, but no real distinction. In fundamental metaphysics there is no real distinction between an object’s categorical properties and its dispositional properties. So too there is no real distinction between an object and its properties. And in fundamental metaphysics, for X and Y to be such that there is no real distinction between them is for them to be identical.
Keywords real distinction  identity  categorical  dispositional  property
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DOI 10.1093/analys/68.4.271
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References found in this work BETA

From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1994 - Cogito 8 (2):141-146.

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