What is the relation between an experience, the subject of the experience, and the content of the experience?

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315 (2003)
Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin
This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, its content C, and its (thin) subject S, [C ↔ E ↔ S]; and, second, that the metaphysical fact that underlies this (strong modal) equivalence is in fact identity: [E = S = C]. I suggest that the effort of thought required to grasp this is deeply revealing of the nature of reality. On the way I raise a doubt about the viability of the traditional object/property distinction.
Keywords Content  Materialism  Metaphysics  Mind  Object  Property  Subject  Self  Identity
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DOI 10.1111/1533-6077.00015
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.

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Citations of this work BETA

No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership.Monima Chadha - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):14-27.
The Mineness of Experience.Wolfgang Fasching - 2009 - Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.

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