In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Clarendon Press. pp. 121 (2007 [2003])

Sarah Stroud
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests that the alleged possibility of global akrasia actually supports the practical‐judgement model over what she considers its main rival, a kind of ‘Humean externalism’ about practical reason.
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DOI 10.1093/0199257361.003.0006
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