Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):97-111 (1981)

Authors
Herlinde Pauer-Studer
University of Vienna
Abstract
Since Edmund L. Gettier's famous paper a series of counterexamples has been raised against the traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief. Some of these (not only Gettier-type) counterexamples can be ruled out by adding a fourth condition to the traditional account which demands a causal connection between the belief of a person and the fact the person believes. This causal connection is specified in a particular way so that counterexamples put forward against causal accounts of knowledge are likewise eliminated
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps1981145
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