Erkenntnis 49 (3):321-335 (1998)

Authors
Scott Sturgeon
University of Birmingham
Abstract
David Lewis's approach to objective chance is doubly distinctive. On the one hand, Lewis uses an epistemic principle to disclose the nature of chance. One the other, Lewis conjoins realism about chance with a reductive Humean metaphysics. I aim to undermine both aspects of his view. Specifically, I argue that reductive Humeanism fails across the board, and I use my discussion of chance to explain why. I also argue Lewis's "best-systems" approach to chance fails his own criteria for a metaphysics of chance. (edited)
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005465308167
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Reduction of Mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
Critical Notice. [REVIEW]David Lewis - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (2):211 – 224.

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Citations of this work BETA

Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2010 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.
Who's Afraid of Undermining?Peter B. M. Vranas - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):151-174.
The Metaphysics of Chance.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):938-952.

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