Irrationality remains a central issue in the philosophy of psychoanalysis. While some approaches in the philosophy of mind have argued that irrationality demands no special account, one of the central conceptual planks of psychoanalytic theory is the notion that irrational motivations have their origin in the dynamic unconscious. This article reviews recent attempts to account for the phenomenon of motivated irrationality, and argues that the problem of self-understanding will remain central to the philosophy of mind so long as we accept the notion of rational agency. Any account of the mind which ignores or denies the appeal of first-person mental phenomena risks rendering itself unintelligible as a convincing account of the conscious subject.
Keywords Mind  Psychoanalysis  Rationality  Science  Self  Gardner, S
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In Search of Normativity of Unconscious Reasoning.G. Glas - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):49-54.

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