Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):77-100 (2007)

Authors
Dieter Sturma
Universität Bonn
Abstract
Persons are present in the social realm of reasons and make active use of their ability to express themselves. They have a sense of self-reference and lead their lives in the perspective of possible self-consciousness and possible autonomy. For understanding what it means for a person to be a subject one must avoid egological reifications. Expressions like 'self' or 'self-reference' do not refer to entities. They can only be introduced in a way that meets standards of semantic control. Self- reference proves to be an inner-worldly phenomenon that expresses itself indirectly in reflexive attitudes and activities over time
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